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Constitutional
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PROCEEDINGS-

Department of Health and RehabilitativeServices v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d
865 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
John Arthur Herzog and Marlene Herzog filed a petition for
adoption in the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and
for Polk County, Florida. The minor child they planned to adopt
had been born out of wedlock, and the Herzogs attached the mother's
signed consent form to their petition.' Pursuant to a provision of
Florida's adoption statute in effect at that time,2 the Division of
Family Services of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS), began an investigation into the adoptability of the
child and the suitability of the prospective parents. As part of its investigation into the child's adoptability, HRS sought to ascertain
whether the natural father had notice of the proposed adoption.3
Shortly thereafter the circuit court enjoined HRS "from inquiring
into the identity of the natural father or otherwise into the paternity
of the subject child, save and except as to his physical condition and
characteristics. " 4 The court offered to modify its order, however, if
HRS could show that the natural father had contributed to the child's
5
birth or support or had shown interest in the child in any other way.
HRS did not contend that it had evidence of support or interest, but
it appealed the issuance of the injunction, asserting that failure to give
notice to the natural father would violate his due process rights and
leave the validity of the adoption open to attack. 6 The Second District
1.

Department of Health and Rehab. Serv's v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 2d

Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. The provision required in part:
Upon or prior to the filing of a petition for the adoption of any minor child,
a study shall be made of all pertinent details relating to such child for the
purpose of ascertaining whether he is a proper subject for adoption, and the
petitioner or petitioners, to determine whether they are suitable persons to adopt
such child.
Act of May 20, 1955, ch. 29674, § 1, 1955 Fla. Laws 150 (repealed 1973). The adoption
statute has since been revised. It now provides in relevant part: "An investigation
shall be made . . . to ascertain whether the adoptive home is a suitable home for
the minor and the proposed adoption is in the best interest of the minor." FLA. STAT.
§ 63.122(5) (1975).
3. 317 So. 2d at 866.
4. Id. at 867.
5. Id.
6. Brief of Appellant at 10. The brief asserted:
If the natural father does not receive legal notice, without which the court lacks
jurisdiction to sever his parental rights, said natural father may enter at any time-
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Court of Appeal ruled against HRS, holding that since the father of
the prospective adoptive child had shown no interest in the child, the
lower court "was within its authority to prohibit the appellant from
7
trying to ferret him out."
The issue was whether every putative father had to be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the child could be adopted by
strangers. Resolution of this issue required an analysis of the nature
of parental rights and the proper termination of those rights, particularly in light of two recent United States Supreme Court cases:
Stanley v. Illinois" and Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services.9 These
two decisions caused HRS to initiate a procedure of notifying putative
fathers, when possible, before certifying that illegitimate children were
proper subjects for adoption. 0
The Stanley case arose following the death of Joan Stanley, with
whom Peter Stanley had lived for eighteen years, fathering three
children. The parents never married."' Upon Joan's death, the children
were declared wards of the court under an Illinois statute which
2
defined parent of an illegitimate child as meaning only the mother.'
even years hence-and question the adoption. Whether the father would succeed
in a cause of this type is not the issue. The child would be put through great
trauma, possibly scarring him emotionally for life by the occurrence of such a court
battle.
Id. The Department's appeal did not deal with the Herzogs' suitability as adoptive
parents, but questioned whether the child was, as the statute required, "a proper
subject for adoption." See note 2 supra.
7. 317 So. 2d at 867, 868. Though the appellees challenged HRS on the issue of
standing, the Second District Court of Appeal pointed out that then FLA. STAT. § 63.091
(1971), which assigned responsibility to HRS, also expressly gave HRS standing. Id. at 866.
8. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). The rights of Rothstein and his child were litigated in
this case and in two others: Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv's, 178 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1970)
and Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv's, 207 N.W.2d 826 (Wis. 1973).
10. 317 So. 2d at 866.
11. 405 U.S. at 646. No explanation is given for the identical last names of the
parents.
12. The Juvenile Court Act, § 1-14, 1965 I11.Laws 2585. The law now states,
"'Parent' means the father or mother of a legitimate child, or illegitimate child, and
includes any adoptive parent. It does not include a parent whose rights in respect of
the minor have been terminated in any manner provided by law." Act of Sept. 6, 1973,
P.A. 78-531, § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1975). The Adoption Statute defines
the parent similarly: " 'Parent' means the father or mother of a legitimate or illegitimate
child." Act of Sept. 14, 1973, P.A. 78-854, § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (E) (1975).
The Illinois juvenile court law now provides for notice to a putative father, as follows:
Upon the written request to any Clerk of any Circuit Court by any interested
party, including persons intending to adopt a child, a child welfare agency with
whom the mother has placed or has given written notice of her intention to
place a child for adoption, the mother of a child, or any attorney representing
an interested party, a notice may be served on a putative father in the same
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manner as Summons is served in other proceedings under this Act, or in lieu of
personal service, service may be made as follows:
(a) The person requesting notice shall furnish to the Clerk an original
and one copy of a notice together with an Affidavit setting forth the putative
father's last known address. The original notice shall be retained by the Clerk.
(b) The Clerk forthwith shall mail to the putative father, at the address
appearing in the Affidavit, the copy of the notice, certified mail, return receipt
requested; the envelope and return receipt shall bear the return address of the
Clerk. The recipt [sic] for certified mail shall state the name and address of the
addressee, and the date of mailing, and shall be attached to the original notice.
(c) The return receipt, when returned to the Clerk, shall be attached to the
original notice, and shall constitute proof of service.
(d) The Clerk shall note the fact of service in a permanent record.
The notice shall be signed by the Clerk, and may be served on the putative
father at any time after conception, and shall read as follows:
"IN THE MATTER OF NOTICE TO
PUTATIVE FATHER.
You have been identified as the father of a child (born on the
day of
day
., 19---), or (expected to be born on or about the
of
, 19-). The mother of said child is
The mother has indicated she intends to place the child for adoption or
otherwise have a judgment entered terminating her rights with respect to such
child.
As the alleged father of said child, you have certain legal rights with respect
to said child, including the right to notice of the filing of proceedings instituted
for the termination of your parental rights regarding said child. If you wish
to retain your rights with respect to said child, you must file with the Clerk of
this Circuit Court of
County, Illinois, whose address is
..................
Illinois, within 30 days after the date of
receipt of this notice, a declaration of paternity stating that you are, in fact,
the father of said child and that you intend to retain your legal rights with
respect to said child, or request to be notified of any further proceedings with
respect to custody, termination of parental rights or adoption of the child.
If you do not file such a declaration of paternity, or a request for notice, then
whatever legal rights you have with respect to said child, including the right to
notice of any future proceedings for the adoption of said child, may be terminated
without any further notice to you. When your legal rights with respect to said
child are so terminated, you will not be entitled to notice of any proceeding
instituted for the adoption of said child.
If you are not the father of said child, you may file with the Clerk of this
Court, a disclaimer of paternity which will be noted in the Clerk's file and you
will receive no further notice with respect to said child."
The names of adoptive parents, if any, shall not be included in the notice.
If the putative father files a disclaimer of paternity, he shall be deemed not
to be the father of the child with respect to any adoption or other proceeding
held to terminate the rights of parents as respects such child.
In the event the putative father does not file a declaration of paternity of the
child or request for notice within 30 days of service of the above notice, he
need not be made a party to or given notice of any proceeding brought for the
adoption of the child. An Order or Judgment may be entered in such proceeding
terminating all of his rights with respect to said child without further notice to
him.
If the putative father files a declaration of paternity or a request for notice ....
with respect to the. child, he shall be given notice in the event any proceeding is
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Stanley appealed, claiming he had a right to a hearing as to his fitness
as a parent. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court denied Stanley's claim,
asserting that "neither the class of prospective custodians and guardians,
nor the class of 'unwed fathers,' had any rights to control or custody."'1
The Illinois court found the Illinois statute constitutional: "The distinction between the class of mothers and the class of fathers is
rationally related to the Illinois law . . . and thus it is not constitu-

tionally mandated that Stanley be accorded the rights which accrue
15
to the class of natural mothers of illegitimate children."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari', "to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be
allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers
-whether divorced, widowed, or separated-and mothers-even if unwed-the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their
children.' 17 The answer was in the negative. The Court ruled that
Stanley had a due process right to a hearing regarding his fitness as a
parent before his children could be taken from him. 8 The Court
further asserted that the right to have and raise children was an
"essential" right, not excluded in "those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."' 9
Two weeks after the Stanley decision, the Supreme Court again
dealt with the issue of notice to a putative father. In Rothstein the
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court a case involving a very different factual
situation.20 Jerry Rothstein claimed to be the father of John Thomas
Lewis. One week after the baby was born, the mother surrendered
her parental rights; one week later the baby was placed in the home
of prospective adoptive parents. When Rothstein discovered that the
brought for the adoption of the child or for termination of parents' rights of the
child.
The Clerk shall maintain separate numbered files and records of requests and
proofs of service and all other documents filed pursuant to this article. All such
records shall be impounded.
Act of Sept. 6, 1973, P.A. 78-531, § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9.4 (1975).
13. In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814 (IlI. 1970).
14. Id. at 815 (emphasis in original).
15. Id.
16. Stanley v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
17. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972). In its decision, the Supreme Court
criticized the irrebuttable presumption and noted that the State of Illinois "continues
to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children and that it
is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings ....
Id.
18. Id. at 649.
19. Id. at 651.
20. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv's,
178 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1970).
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mother had given up the child, he petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, arguing that he had not consented to the termination of his
parental rights.

21

On first hearing the Wisconsin Supreme Court had dismissed the
petition, holding that "illegitimate fathers have no right to the
custody of their illegitimate children"; 2 2 after remand from the United
States Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a factual
hearing. The referee determined that Rothstein was the father, that
he was a fit person for custody, "but that he should not be granted
custody because it would be in the best interests of the child to remain
with the 'adoptive parents.' "23 Rothstein then filed for a denial of the
referee's recommendation.

24

Chief Justice Hallows of the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
dissented from the earlier decision, asserting that the statutes which
terminated parental rights without consent or notice were "unconstitutional when applied to a known father of a child born out of wedlock
because they make a violation and a classification out of illegitimacy
2 5
which is unreasonable and has no basis in fact excepting expediency."
On appeal from the referee's determination, Hallows wrote the majority
opinion. Reviewing the original action, the chief justice stated unequivocally that "[c]onsent of both the unwed mother and the unwed
father, or consent of one parent with proper termination of the
parental rights of the other, is necessary." 26 Despite the referee's
decision that the best interest of the child would be served by leaving
the child with his "adoptive parents," the court ruled that the issue
of parental rights "should be viewed as of the period of time when the
issue should have been determined and when the petitioner's constitu2
tional rights were denied him." 7
21. 178 N.W.2d at 56.
22. Id. at 57.
23. 207 N.W.2d at 828.
24. Id. As for the "adoption," the court observed:
We point out that there was an injunction against the adoption of John Thomas
Lewis while the matter was under consideration of this court, and the child
was secretly adopted without notice to this court, the guardian ad litem, or the
petitioner during the period in which a rehearing motion might have been
made to this court. Consequently, when this matter reached the United States
Supreme Court on appeal the child had been adopted with full knowledge of the
pending litigation and the alleged legal infirmities involved. Under these circumstances, we cannot hold that the adoption was valid or that Stanley is only of
academic concern and not applicable.
id. at 829.
25. 178 N.W.2d at 65.
26. 207 N.W.2d at 830. Wisconsin statutes now reflect this view. Wis. STAT. § 48.84
(1973).
27. 207 N.W.2d at 831. This ruling attempted to rectify the inequity implicit in
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Both Stanley and Rothstein grant rights to fathers of illegitimate
children on the ground that due process requirements are violated when
a state creates an irrebuttable presumption that the putative father is
an unfit parent. 28 The Stanley Court asserted: "[I]t is more convenient
to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the
issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family."29
Herzog addressed essentially the same issues as Stanley and Rothstein: what are the legal rights of natural parents and how may those
rights be terminated? It is important to realize that under existing
Florida law parental rights are not equal for both sexes. Although a
mother of an illegitimate child is accorded full parental rights unless
they are surrendered or legally terminated, a father under equivalent
circumstances may find that his legal rights never vested. An outline
may help the reader to visualize the situation:
NATURAL PARENTS-STATUS
I. Mother
II. Father
A. Of legitimate or legitimated child
B. Of illegitimate child
1. Recognized by the law
2. Not recognized by the law
a. Uninterested in child
b. Unaware of child
I. Mother. Under Florida law, a mother's parental rights do not
depend on the child's legitimacy. From the moment the child is born,
the mother's full legal rights remain intact,30 unless she surrenders
them or is found to be an unfit parent,-" or a court awards custody to
32
the father in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.
the referee's decision, namely, that solely because Jerry Rothstein was delayed three
and one-half years by litigation, the goal of the litigation-custody of his child-was
not to be realized. The court noted: "[T]he child on November 11, 1969, had only
been in the temporary custody of the foster parents for a short time. The petitioner
should not be faulted because the respondent agency and the adoptive parents have
kept petitioner from seeing his child pending this proceeding." Id. at 832.
28. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) ("Statutes creating permanent
irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."), See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
29. 405 U.S. at 658.
30. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1975) ("The mother of a child born out of wedlock
is the natural guardian of the child.").
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.11, 63.072 (1975).
32. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1975). A custody award is not equivalent to a termination
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II. Father. Under the law the father's rights are restricted by consideration of his relationship to the child's mother.3s
A. Father of legitimate or legitimated child. The father of a legitimate or legitimated14 child has the same rights as the mother. His
rights continue unless he surrenders them, they are terminated by a
court in a fitness proceeding, or custody is awarded to the mother in a
dissolution of marriage.35
B. Father of illegitimate child. At common law an illegitimate
child was deemed a nullius filius, a son of no one; under this concept
the putative father had no legal relationship to the child.3 6 This has
changed, and the relationship between father and child has been
defined and regulated by statute. 37 Florida's Paternity Act, for example,
requires the father to pay child support and the expenses "incident
to the birth of such child."-"
Several Florida cases have spoken to the parental rights of fathers of
illegitimate children. In Fielding v. Highsmith, the Florida Supreme
Court stated that a natural parent must be given the opportunity to be
heard before his parental rights can be terminated; any other procedure would be "despotic in the extreme and contrary to the plainest
principles of morality and justice." ' In Fieldingan adoption was ruled
invalid because no attempt to give notice to the natural father was
made even though "the father could have been located by diligent
search and inquiry." 40 This 1943 case was unusual, however, in that
the child was born of, but not during, the marriage. Furthermore,
although the court agreed with Highsmith that he should have had
notice, it remanded and ordered the lower court to award custody to
the other family because Highsmith had "virtually abandoned the
of parental rights; custody awards are open to revisions and modifications, but
terminations are virtually irrevocable.
33. Even if the husband of the mother at the time of birth is not actually the
father of her child, he is generally presumed to be. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d
163 (Fla. 1944).
34. If the child is illegitimate at the time of birth but the father subsequently
marries the mother, the child is legitimated by operation of law. FLA. STAT. § 742.091
(1975).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.11, 61.13, 63.072 (1975).
36. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv's, 178 N.W.2d at 65. But the majority opinion also
acknowledged an early common-law right of the putative father to custody as against
all but the mother. Id. at 58. See Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be
Heard, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1071, 1072 (1966); Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate
Child-Father's Right to Notice, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 232.
37. Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be Heard. supra note 36,
at 1073.
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 742.031, .041 (1975).
39. 13 So. 2d 208, 209 (Fla. 1943).

40. Id.
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child" and had "allowed the child to remain in the custody of others
for such a long period of time that a strong mutual attachment exists
between them." 41 Highsmith forfeited his right to custody even though
his right to notice was intact.
A 1964 case, Clements v. Banks, dealt with the adoption of an
illegitimate child by the mother's subsequent husband.4 2 The court
ruled the natural father, who was married to another woman but
had been voluntarily contributing to the child's support, had no
rights to the child:
In this cause, he [the natural father] has pointed to no statutes or
decisions of this State which give him any rights in and to an illegitimate child. In fact, the statutes of this State indicate that an illegitimate father shall not have any rights to an illegitimate child, in
that his consent is not necessary to an adoption . . . and for the
purpose of determining the48matters within the juvenile court he is
not considered as a parent.
Brown v. Bray44 involved an equal protection challenge to the
constitutionality of the then-named Florida Bastardy Statute,4 5 on
the basis that the statute denied the father of an illegitimate child the
same right to custody accorded the father of a legitimate child under
the Dissolution of Marriage Act. 4" The Florida Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the statute, saying that it allowed, though it
did not require, the circuit courts to consider granting custody to a
putative father, even as those courts were allowed to consider granting
47
custody to the father in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.
In resolving a custody contest between the mother and the putative
father, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal in In re R.L.G.
ruled that the putative father had no right of custody unless the
mother was shown to be unfit." The court asserted, "All jurisdictions:
recognize that within the framework of this principle [best interests
of the child] the mother of an illegitimate child has a natural primary
or prima facie right to the custody of a child as against a putative father
41. Id. at 210.
42. 159 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
43. Id. at 893 (citations omitted).
44. 300 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1974).
-45. FLA. STAT. ch. 742 (1975) (as amended by ch. 75-166, §§ 5-7, 1975 Fla. Laws 298).
The 1975 amendments deleted references to bastardy and changed the title of the statute

to Determination of Paternity.
46.

FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (1975).

47.
48.

300 So. 2d at 670 (dictum).
274 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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unless she is proved to be an unfit person to be entrusted with such a
4

charge." 9
1. Recognized by the law. Pursuant to Stanley, the Florida Legisla-

ture amended the adoption statute in order to provide notice to certain
known and legally recognized fathers of illegitimate children. Unless
specifically excused by the court, the statute requires consent of the
father if his paternity has been adjudicated; if "[h]e has acknowledged
in writing . . .that he is the father of the minor and has filed such

acknowledgment with the Bureau of Vital Statistics"; or if he has
given financial support to the child "in a repetitive, customary
manner."50 By implication, if the putative father is "known" but has
failed to assert or accept that status in one of the legally recognized
ways, then consent from him is not statutorily required.
2. Not recognized by the law. The father of a child may be un-

recognized by the law for several reasons: the mother may not know
who the father is; the mother may know but not reveal the information to the "state," 5' to anyone, or to anyone but the father. In the
last instance the father has the opportunity, at least, to acknowledge
and support his child, thereby bringing himself into the legally
recognized category protected by statute. But if the mother withholds
her knowledge, the father's rights are effectively terminated.
The Stanley opinions, especially the Illinois Supreme Court
opinion 52 and the dissent by Chief Justice Burger in the United States
Supreme Court,5 3 indicate a willingness to allow termination of
parental rights because the father fails to conform to the legal and
social standards for a father who cares about his children. Had Peter
Stanley married the mother of his children, his rights would have been
protected without challenge.
The current Florida law on adoption seems to imply that if the
father does not show enough concern about his child to acknowledge

49. Id. at 5. All of the statutes, court decisions, agency actions, and personal
actions purport to be "in the best interests of the child." In reality, often it is the
best interests of others that are being met. For a creative discussion of this issue, see
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
50. FLA. STAT. § 63.062(l)(b) (1975).
51. Under the 1974 Social Services Amendments, a mother receiving an Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) grant is required to cooperate with the
state in its efforts to identify, locate, and collect child support payments. Her refusal
to cooperate results in a decrease in the grant. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (Supp. V 1975).
For a discussion of those amendments, see Comment, Enforcement of Child Support
Obligationsof Absent Parents-SocialServices Amendments of 1974, 30 Sw. L.J. 625 (1976).
See also FLA. STAT. § 409.245 (1975).
52. 256 N.E.2d 814 (Il. 1970).
53. 405 U.S. at 659.
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it and support it, then he has no claim to the child.54 Usually, however,
a mother who does not show enough concern to support her child is
afforded notice and opportunity for hearing before her parental rights
are severed. Parental right to consent may be waived by the court as
to either parent if the court finds desertion or abandonment, 55 but
this finding and waiver requires affirmative action by the court whereas
failure to give notice requires only inaction. Thus, a mother's rights
may be involuntarily terminated after an affirmative action by the
court, but a father's may be effectively terminated in the absence of
affirmative efforts by failure to identify him and give him any notice.
The disparity reflects a simple biological reality. By virtue of the
physical requirements of pregnancy and birth, the mother is automatically present and accounted for, facilitating compliance with the
notice requirement. It is not necessary for the father to be involved
after conception takes place.
It does not follow, however, that convenience afforded by anatomy
should dictate construction of constitutional due process requirements. In Herzog the father was unknown, but not necessarily unknowable. The court enjoined HRS from even inquiring as to the
identity of the father unless HRS could show support or interest on his
part. May Stanley be thus construed to give due process rights only as
to known and legally recognized fathers? Chief Justice Hallows of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly believed that Stanley applied to both
known and unknown natural fathers:
In Stanley, the supreme court decided two things: (1) That the denial
of a natural father's parental rights to a child born out of wedlock
based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws, and (2) that the termination of a natural
father's parental rights to a child born out of wedlock without actual
notice to him, if he was known, or constructive notice, if unknown,
and without giving him the right to be heard on the termination
of his rights denied him due process of law.51
Though it may well cause serious administrative inconvenience if
54. In In re Adoption of Wilson, 328 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
the court noted that failure to pay child support, though not sufficient standing alone
to obviate the necessity for the father's consent to adoption of his child, is "a relevant
circumstance to be considered in granting a petition for adoption." Compare In re
Adoption of Eddy, 487 P.2d 1362, 1367 (Okla. 1971), where the Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruled that the willful failure of a natural, legitimate father to make child support
payments which were required by the divorce decree "obviated the necessity of his
consent" to adoption of his children by the stepfather.
55. FLA. STAT. § 63.072(1) (1975).
56. 207 N.W.2d at 828.
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putative fathers must be sought out and notified of pending procedures
to terminate parental rights, inconvenience alone is no excuse for
denial of due process.5 7 Expanding on that theme, the Supreme Court
in Vlandis v. Kline noted that administrative ease and certainty must
give way when there are "reasonable and practicable means of
establishing the pertinent facts .

,"581

The Second District Court of Appeal in Herzog was not concerned
about administrative difficulty but was concerned about confidentiality
and the possible misidentification of putative fathers. The consequences of "ferreting out" putative fathers could be "counterproductive." The court observed:
Far be it from preserving the interests of a putative father, the
practical effect would be more likely to penalize him. It would be
difficult enough when the process server came to the home of a
married man to ask about his illegitimate child, but what could be
expected if the mother was mistaken or was simply being spiteful.
Perhaps more significant would be the fact that pursuing such a
of
policy would make it extremely difficult to keep the identity
59
adoptive parents from the natural parents, and vice versa.
Mothers might, of course, be mistaken or spiteful, but the requirement that the mother name the father if she knows his identity is no
more than is required under both state and federal law of mothers
who apply for welfare payments.60 Perhaps the state has a duty to
protect the rights of putative fathers commensurate with its effort to
impose responsibilities."
Confidentiality in adoption proceedings is also a very real concern
of both natural parents and adoptive parents. Florida law provides
that both hearings and records be confidential and even specifies that
57. "I']he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.
58. 412 U.S. at 451. Vlandis was not a family law case, but involved a determination
of out-of-state residency for purposes of assessing student tuition and fees. If a married
student had applied from an out-of-state address or if a single student had a legal
address outside the state at any time during the year preceding the application for
admission, the student was irrebuttably presumed to be an out-of-state student for the
entire time she was in school. The Supreme Court held that the state had violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by refusing to allow students who
were bona fide residents of the state a chance to establish that fact. See generally note 28
supra.
59. 317 So. 2d at 867.
60. See note 51 supra.
61. The United States Supreme Court in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), made
it dear that statutorily required child support must include support for illegitimate,
as well as legitimate, children.
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records regarding adoption of a minor "shall be indexed only in the
name of the petitioner, and the name of the minor shall not be noted
on any docket, index, or other record outside the court file." 82 The
question then becomes how to balance the need for confidentiality
with the need to protect the rights of all the people involved.
In Herzog, HRS voiced its concern about a possible future challenge
to the adoption. HRS asserted that if an attempt were not made to
identify the putative father and to terminate his parental rights, the
adoption might be open to challenge later by the putative father.
Even if the challenge were unsuccessful, the child could be injured
by the uncertainty. In addition, HRS was concerned that under
Stanley and Rothstein the putative father might prevail, which would
bring into question the stability and security of other adoptions.63
Stanley and Rothstein are distinguishable from Herzog. In both,
the natural father had shown an interest in the child, a circumstance
the Herzog court identified as one which would prompt the court to
modify its order.6 4 Such judicial flexibility does not, however, respond
to the possibility that the father does not know of the child but would
want to provide support or even take custody of the child if he knew.
As Wisconsin's Chief Justice Hallows stated the issue: "Under the
present law, fathers must come forward. But how can such a father
come forward if there is no notice?"' 65
Adoption should be a final and irrevocable act. Since the Florida
adoption statute as construed by Herzog does not require an inquiry
into the identity of a putative father, nor does it require that notice
and opportunity to be heard be given all putative fathers, a statutory
revision is needed. This writer believes that the necessary statutory
change could be accomplished quite readily if chapter 63-the adoption
statute-were to incorporate the notice provisions of chapter 39-the
juvenile statute-or if the Florida adoption statute were to incorporate
a provision similar to the Illinois statute on notice to putative fathers.
The Illinois statute deals explicitly with the objection mentioned by
the Herzog court, namely, embarrassment to a man wrongfully
identified as the putative father, by setting forth a disclaimer provision. 66
If the notice provisions of chapter 39, Florida Statutes, are utilized,
the relevant portions are subsections 39.11(5) and (6), which govern
62.
63.

FLA. STAT. § 63.162(1)-(3) (1975).
Brief of Appellant at 10, 13.

64. 317 So. 2d at 867.
65. 178 N.W.2d at 67.
66. Act of Sept. 6, 1973, P.A. 78-531, § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9.4 (1975).
For the exact wording of the Notice to Putative Father provision, see note 12 supra.
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the permanent commitment of a dependent child to a licensed childplacing agency or HRS. The first step of every adoption of a dependent
child under that chapter is a complete termination of parental rights.
In order to so terminate those rights, the statute provides for personal
notice when possible, notice by publication when personal notice is
not possible, or waiver by written surrender of the child.
Incorporation of a similar provision into chapter 63, the Florida
adoption statute, would forestall cases such as Herzog and grant everyone involved the rights and protections necessary for the security of
an adoption proceeding. By making the adoption procedure a twostep process-termination of parental rights followed by creation of
parental rights-the confidentiality need could also be met.
M. CATHERINE LANNON

Criminal Law-ETHIcs-PuBLIc

DEFENDER'S OFFICE IS A "LAW

FOR PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHETHER CONFLICT EXISTS IN

SENTATION OF CODEFENDANTS- Turner

FIRM"
REPRE-

v. State, 340 So. 2d 132 (Fla.

2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
On July 19, 1976, Ernest W. Turner, Arthur T. Longway, and
Thomas C. Hyder were charged in a single information with the
offense of burglary of a structure in violation of section 810.02, Florida
Statutes.' The public defender was appointed to represent the three
2
codefendants after each had executed an affidavit of insolvency.
During a routine intake interview with Thomas Hyder, it was discovered that a conflict of interest existed among the defenses of the
three men. Moreover, the assistant state attorney assigned to the prosecution of the three defendants informed both the public defender's
office and the court that each defendant had made statements that
implicated another codefendant. Consequently, the public defender's
office moved to be relieved as counsel for Turner and Longway. The
trial court relieved one assistant public defender as individual counsel
for Turner and Longway, but refused to appoint private counsel to
represent them on the ground that separate attorneys within the public
defender's office could properly represent the three codefendants.3
1. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1975) provides: "'Burglary' means entering or remaining
in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless
the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited
to enter or remain." The offense may be a felony of the first, second, or third degree
depending on the circumstances involved.
2: See FLA. STAT. § 27.52 (1975).
3, The trial court stated: "fI]tappear[s] to the Court that the Public Defender

